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Suum cuique is our Roman justice (Shakesp. Tit. Andr. 
1,1,284) – William Shakespeare, Heiner Müller and Roman 
fundamenta*
Law, says the judge as he looks down his nose,
Speaking clearly and most severely,
Law is as I’ve told you before,
Law is as you know I suppose,
Law is but let me explain it once more,
Law is The Law.
W.H. Auden “Law Like Love,”
The Collected Poetry of W.H. Auden, New York 1945, pp. 74–76
Abstract
The phrase suum cuique as an incarnation of “justice,” like many other Latin dicta, is deeply enrooted in 
the mental consciousness of mankind, and it lives its own life as a part of the so-called universal culture. 
Generally speaking, reference to Roman justice served and still serves as a justifi cation of one’s own 
actions when such actions cannot defend themselves by their own formal correctness. It is, therefore, 
recourse to the eternal values, the understanding of which, however, is determined by one’s own expe-
rience or by experience of a particular epoch. This is proved by words of the authors mentioned in the 
title of the study, though separated from each other by several centuries and having different visions of 
the world, they considered the embodiment of this phenomenon in the phrase suum cuique as the most 
appropriate for their own narrative and judgmental description of the reality. Shakespeare, although he 
undoubtedly saw in Roman justice a guarantee of justifi cation of certain actions, referred to this idea 
without a deeper analysis. Müller, one of the most important German dramatists of the second half of 
the 20th century, screaming through the voice of Tamora, who demands “Roman justice,” showed that 
a call for Roman fundamenta as well as for Roman iura et mores almost for the last time stands in the 
* The study is based on my unpublished paper delivered during a conference organised by the Chair of 
Roman Law of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin in Kazimierz Dolny nad Wisłą, 17–19 of May 
2013, under the general title “Prawo w poezji – poezja w prawie. Refl eksje antyczne” [Law in Poetry–Poetry 
in Law. Refl ections on Antiquity”. 
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unsolved confl ict with one’s own inhumane actions and infl ation of all values that mankind has persis-
tently considered as permanent. 
The article aims to analyse a cultural commentary on the use of the phrase suum cuique – a commentary 
understood as a way of bringing something that is analysed into the reality current for a commentator. 
In one dimension, this can be a dramatic comment rather than a simple description of a certain reality. 
Therefore, such a commentary should not be assigned only to a single commentator-narrator but to 
many who represent different eras.
Key words: justice, suum cuique, Roman law, drama, Shakespeare, Müller
Słowa klucze: sprawiedliwość, suum cuique, prawo rzymskie, dramat, Szekspir, Müller
1. Introduction 
The phrase suum cuique, like many other Latin dicta, is deeply enrooted in the mental 
consciousness of mankind. Today it lives its own life as a part of the so-called universal 
culture1 quite often deprived of its proper, i.e. ancient origins. As such, the phrase suum 
cuique is a kind of ideological memorial. One can also say that its presence in the cultural 
discourse of modernity is an expression of continuous longing for particular “universal 
ethics”:2 Justitia cernitur in suum cuique tribuendo.3 Many years ago Georg von Beseler 
stated that the philosophy of a jurist is simple: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum 
cuique tribuere, and we, smart people of the 20th century, can express this idea using 
many more words and scientifi c terms yet we cannot put it better than Roman jurists.4
This study, however, does not aim to present an exhaustive analysis of a sense and 
importance of the aforementioned phrase neither in its ancient nor later meaning, espe-
cially because this meaning has already varied in times, being almost always bounded 
with the idea of natural law. What will be important here, is a subsequent and exempla-
rily chosen cultural commentary on this phrase – a commentary understood as a way of 
bringing something that is being commented into the reality current to the commentator. 
In other words, the study attempts to present both an analysis of the context of use of 
1 In almost every collection of Latin dicta, sententiones, maximae published so far, one can fi nd this 
phrase, to refer only to: R. Tosi, Dizionario comparato di proverbi e modi proverbiali italiani, latini, fransi, 
spagnoli, tedeschi, inglesi e greci antichi, ed. 2, Milano 1952, no. 1117, 1118, 1119; Z. Landowski, K. Woś, 
Słownik cytatów łacińskich. Wyrażenia. Sentencje. Przysłowia [Dictionary of Latin Quotations. Expressions. 
Dicta. Proverbs], Kraków 2002, p. 540. See also statements of such authors as: K.L. Koniński, Ex labyrintho, 
Warszawa 1962, pp. 250–251; J. Gawroński, Do źródła muz. Greckie wrażenia dyletanta [To the Source of 
the Muses. Greek Impressions of a Dilettante], Warszawa 1970, p. 65; R. Ingarden, Książeczka o człowieku 
[A Short Book on a Man], Kraków 1973, pp. 106–107; J.M. Bocheński, Szkice etyczne [Ethical Essays], 
Londyn 1953, p. 106.
2 See, general remarks, by: M. Korolko, Słownik kultury śródziemnomorskiej w Polsce. Idee. Pojęcia. 
Miejsca z wypisami literackimi [Dictionary of Mediterranean Culture in Poland. Ideas. Concepts. Literary 
Excerpts], Warszawa 2004, pp. 143–144, s.v. dikaiosyne; idem, Thesaurus albo Skarbiec łacińskich sentencji, 
przysłów i powiedzeń w literaturze polskiej [Thesaurus or the Latin Treasury of Quotes, Proverbs and Dicta 
in the Polish Literature], Warszawa 2004, pp. 827–828, s.v. suum cuique. 
3 Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichwörter, Zusammengestellt, übersetzt und erläutert von 
D. Liebs, unter Mitarbeit von H. Lehmann und G. Strobel, München 1982, p. 107 J. 192.
4 After: H. Otte, Gustav Radbruchs Kieler Jahre 1919–1926, Frankfurt am Main–Bern 1981, p. 47. 
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the phrase suum cuique understood as a commentary on it, as well as a determination of 
a function or functions of such a use. In a certain dimension, this type of commentary is 
more than a simple description; it is an endorsement as well as drama. What is more, any 
commentary should not be assigned only to one commentator but, a contrario, it should 
somehow be “commissioned” to many narrators representing diverse epochs. 
2. The Ancient Tradition 
Suum cuique tribuens/tribuere is, generally speaking, a short defi nition, a maxim, even 
a regula iuris,5 regarded quite commonly as embracing the essence of “justice” and “eq-
uity” (iustitia & aequitas), the fundaments of any system of natural law, or even an 
affi rmation of the sanctity of human rights.6 Originating from Justinian’s Institutiones 
– a 6th century A.D. “student book” it defi nes one of iuris praecepta incarnated into 
a formula: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere suum cuique tribuere, which means: “to 
live honestly, not to injure another, and to give everyone that which belongs to them” 
(I. 1,1,3).7 The same statement is almost verbatim repeated in Digesta, another part 
of Justinian’s legislative corpus, attributed herein to the late classical jurist Domitius 
Ulpianus (1 reg. D. 1,1,10 pr.),8 who is probably the author of the statement.9 In the same 
Institutiones, “justice” is explained as constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique 
tribuens, i.e. “constant and perpetual desire to give everyone what he is entitled to” (also 
Ulpianus, 1 reg. D. 1,1,10,1).10 Was (this defi nition) approved by Roman jurists (e.g. 
Tryphoninus, 9 disp. D. 16,3,31,1: […et probo hanc esse iustitiam, quae suum cuique ita 
5 Cf. J. Sondel, Słownik łacińsko-polski dla prawników i historyków [Latin-Polish Dictionary for Lawy-
ers and Historians], Kraków 1997, s.v. canon, regula, praeceptum, norma, pp. 125, 661, 768, 830. For a no-
tion of maxima or regula, see: H. Kupiszewski, Prawo rzymskie a współczesność [Roman Law and Contem-
poraneity], Warszawa 1988, pp. 133 f., 131 f.; P. Stein, Regulae iuris. From Juristic Rules to Legal Maxims, 
Edinburgh 1966, passim, in part. pp. 16, 33, 45, 48, 66; idem, Lo svogliamento storico della nozione di 
“regula iuris” in diritto romano [in:] Antologia giuridica romanistica ed antiquaria I, Milano 1968, pp. 97–
108; B. Schmidlin, Die römischen Rechtsregeln. Versuch einer Typologie, Köln–Wien 1970, p. 61 f.; idem, 
“Horoi”, “pithana” und “regulae” [in:] Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Geschichte und Kultur 
Roms im Spiegel der Neuern Forschung, II.15, Berlin–New York 1976, p. 101 f.
6 Comp. G. MacCormack, Sources [in:] A Companion to Justinian’s Institutes, ed. E. Metzger, London 
2002, p. 1 f.; comp. also F.L. Cheyette, Suum cuique tribuere, “French Historical Studies” 1976, vol. 6, no. 3, 
p. 287 f. 
7 Comp. with: Justinian’s Institutes. Translated with an introduction by Peter Birks & Grant McLeod, 
with the Latin text of Paul Krueger, London 2001, p. 37: “Justice is an unswerving and perpetual determi-
nation to acknowledge all men’s rights;” “The commandments of the law are these: live honorably; harm 
nobody; give everyone his due.” See also an explanation by G. MacCormack, Sources…, p. 1 f. 
8 “Justice is the constant and perpetual desire to give to everyone that to which he is entitled”.
9 Cf. F. Gallo, Diritto e giustizia nel titolo primo del Digesto, “Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris” 
(herafter SDHI) 1988, vol 54, p. 15 f. = Opuscula selecta, a cura di F. Bona, M. Miglietta, Padova 1999, 
p. 621 f.; A. Schiavone, Giuristi e principe nelle Istituzioni di Ulpiano. Un’esegesi, SDHI, 2003, vol. 69, p. 15 
and nt. 28. Comp. also Lateinische Rechtsregeln..., p. 104, J. 177; p. 106 J. 192, J. 195; p. 204, S 89. D. Liebs 
indicated this fragment as a Pseudo-Ulpianus one. 
10 “The precepts of the law are the following: to live honorably, to injure no one, to give everyone his 
due”.
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tribuit, ut non distrahatur ab ullius personae iustiore repetitione […]; comp. however, 
idem 1 disp. D. 11,4,5: iustitiam animadversionis) and adopted by emperor Justinian in 
the very Late Eastern Antiquity, the de facto arch-famous defi nition (that can be proved 
by the number of longer or shorter studies in which authors attempted to analyse its 
content and its importance11), which today belongs to a widely recognised legal tradition 
understood as the cultural transmission (i.e. a tradition received and understood as tradi-
tion re-copied, translated or adopted12).13 It has its specifi c roots in ancient wisdom and as 
such constitutes a component of the ancient “beauty of thought”. It was Marcus Tullius 
Cicero in the late Roman Republic, who for the fi rst time linked suum cuique with the 
beauty, saying in Tusculanae Disputationes (5,22,63) that suum cuique pulchrum est14 
– “to each his own is beautiful”. Although it was not explicitly stated by Arpinate that it 
11 For a more detailed examination of the juridical sources mentioned in this studium only exemplary, 
cfr. in particular: F. Senn, De la justice et du droit. Explication de la défi nition traditionnelle de la justice, 
Paris 1927, passim; W. Cesarini Sforza, ‘”Ius” e “directum”. Note sull’origine storica dell’idea di diritto, 
Bologna 1930, p. 15 f.; L. Wenger, Suum cuique in antiken Urkunden [in:] Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelal-
ters. Studien und Texte zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet Martin 
Grabmann, Bd. 2, Hrsg. A. Lang, J. Lechner, M. Schmans, Münster 1935, p. 1415 f.; A. Carcaterra, Iustitia 
nelle fonti e nella storia del diritto romano, Bari 1949, p. 82, 90; M. Villey, Suum jus cuique tribuens [in:] 
Studi in onore di P. De Francisci, vol. 1, Napoli 1954, p. 364 f.; G. Del Vecchio, La giustizia, ed. 4, Roma 
1959, p. 63 f.; C. Gioffredi, Sul problema del diritto soggettivo nel diritto romano, “Bullettino dell’ Istituto di 
Dirittoi Romano ‘Vittorio Scialoja’” (hereafter BIDR) 1967, vol. 70, p. 231, 238; A. Burdese, Sul concetto di 
giustizia nel diritto romano, “Annali di storia del diritto” 1970–1973, vol. 14–17, p. 108; D. Nörr, Iurisperitus 
sacerdos [in:] Xenion: Festschrift für Pan. J. Zepos anlässlich seines 65. Geburtstages am 1. Dezember 1973, 
Bd. 1, Athen–Freiburg Br.–Köln 1973, p. 555 f.; M. Kaser, Zum ‘ius’-Begriff der Römer [in:] Essays in Honor 
of Ben Beinart [=Acta Juridica”] 1977, vol. 2, p. 67 f.; W. Waldstein, Zu Ulpians Defi nition der Gerechtigkeit 
(D.1,1,10 pr.) [in:] Festschrift für Werner Flume, Bd. 1, in Gemeindschaft mit K. Ballerstedt und F.A. Mann 
rgs. von H.H. Jakobs, B. Knobbe-Keuk, E. Picker, J. Wilhelm, Köln 1978, p. 225 s., 230; idem, Ist das suum 
cuique eine Leerformel?, SDHI 1995, vol. 61, p. 186 f.; idem, Zur juristischen Relevanz der Gerechtigkeit 
bei Aristoteles, Cicero und Ulpian [in:] Der Gerechtigkeitsanspruch des Rechts. Festschrift für Theo Mayer-
Maly, Bd. 3: Rechtsethik, Hrsg. M. Beck-Mannagetta, H. Böhm, G. Graf, Wien 1996, p. 64 f.; U. Von Lübtow, 
Die Anschauungen der römischen Jurisprudenz über Recht und Gerechtigkeit [in:] Studi in onore di Cesare 
Sanfi lippo, vol. 6, Milano 1985, p. 526, 530 f.; M. Diesselhorst, Die Gerechtigkeitsdefi nition Ulpians in 
D.1,1,10 pr. und die Praecepta iuris nach D. 1,1,10,1 sowie ihre Rezeption bei Leibniz und Kant [in:] Römi-
sches Recht in der europäischen Tradition: Symposion aus Anlass des 75. Geburtstages von Franz Wieacker, 
Hrsg. O. Behrends, M. Dießelhorst, W.E Voß, Ebelsbach 1985, p. 185, 190 f.; P. Cerami, “Ordo legum” 
e “iustitia” in Claudio Trifonino, “Annuali del Seminario Giuridico dell’a Università degli Studi dii Palermo” 
(herafter AUPA) 1988, vol. 40, p. 31 f.; F. Gallo, Diritto e giustizia…, p. 19 f. [= idem, Opuscula selecta..., 
p. 628 f.)]; idem, L’interpretazione del diritto è «affabulazione»?, “Rivista di Diritto Romano” 2003, vol. 3, 
p. 39 f.; idem, Aspetti peculiari e qualifi canti della produzione del diritto nell’esperienza romana, “Rivista di 
Diritto Romano” 2004, vol. 4, p. 10; idem, Fondamenti romanistici del diritto europeo: a proposito del ruolo 
della scienza giuridica, “Diritto e Storia” 2005, vol. 4, passim [= Tradizione romanistica e Costituzione, dir. 
da L. Labruna, a cura di M.P. Baccari e C. Cascione, vol. II?? 2, Napoli 2006, p. 1977 s.]; T. Honoré, Ulpian. 
Pioneer of Human Rights, 2 ed., Oxford 2002, p. 215; A. Schiavone, Giuristi e principe…, p. 15 f.; G. Van 
Den Bergh, Jedem das Seine, “Forum historiae iuris” 2005: www.forhistiur.de/zitat/0503vandenbergh.htm, 
§§ 8-10; L. Peppe, “Jedem das Seine”, (uni)cuique suum, “a ciascuno il suo” [in:] Tradizione romanistica 
e Costituzione, vol. 2, p. 1745 f.; G. Falcone, Ius suum cuique tribuere, AUPA 2007–2008, vol. 52, p. 133 f. [= 
Studi in onore di Remo Martini, vol. 1, Milano 2008, p. 971 f.]. 
12 Cf. R. Brague, Europe, la voie romaine, Paris 1992, p. 87 f., 88, 103 f., 108 f.
13 Cf. e.g. M. Kuryłowicz, Prawo rzymskie. Historia tradycja współczesność [Roman Law. History Tra-
dition Contemporaneity], Lublin 2003, pp. 153, 161 f. 
14 Unless noted otherwise, the classical texts are cited according to the editions of “Loeb Classical Li-
brary”, Cambridge–London, Massachusetts. 
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was justice which was to be beautiful – because he explained only that actions of people 
directed in such a way (sc. a way leading to justice) were, per se, beautiful – it still re-
mains true that this declaration can be understood as statement that justice is beautiful, 
and that the Romans were the fi rst to acknowledge it.
It was Cicero again, who in addition to the specifi c use of the Greek formulas
dikaiosÚnh and ¢x…a (e.g. Plat. def. 411 D–E; SVF III, p. 30 n. 125; p. 63 n. 262; p. 65, n. 
266; p. 86 n. 374; also p. 60 n. 256; p. 69 n. 280), in his rhetoric writings combined jus-
tice as suum cuique with dignitas (e.g. de inv. 2,160: iustitia est habitus animi communi 
utilitate conservata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem; comp. auct. ad Her. 3.2.3: iustitia 
est aequitas ius uni cuique rei tribuens pro dignitate cuiusque…).15 It was also Arpinate 
who in his philosophical treaties, when analysing virtutes, used to employ syntagma 
“suum cuique” as a defi nition of justice, stating, inter alia: nam iustitia suum, quae 
cuique distribuit […] hominum enim societas et communitas […] iustitiam procreavit 
(de nat. deor. 3,38), which means that “justice which assigns to each his own […] is the 
offspring of human society and of the commonwealth of man”; or saying that iustitia 
in suo cuique tribuendo [est] (de fi n. 5,67), i.e. “justice [is displayed] in giving each his 
due”.16 One can also fi nd “justice” in the same sense in studium Noctes Atticae, written 
by the scholar, Aulus Gellius, who explained that already at the turn of two epochs, the 
Late Republic and the Principate, and thus on the border of two qualities in the political 
and social history of Rome, it had been Cato the Elder, who understood such a formula-
tion as an adequate notion of justice:
Gell. 13,24: M. Cato consularis et censorius publicis iam privatisque opulentis rebus villas suas 
inexcultas et rudes ne tectorio quidem praelitas fuisse dicit ad annum usque aetatis suae septua-
gesimum. atque ibi postea his verbis utitur: “neque mihi” inquit “aedifi catio neque vasum neque 
vestimentum ullum est manupretiosum neque pretiosus servus neque ancilla. si quid est”, inquit 
“quod utar, utor; si non est, egeo. suum cuique per me uti atque frui licet”. […]
On the other hand, in one of Epistulae morales ad Lucillum by Lucius Annaeus 
Seneca, and afterwards, in Commentariorum quos ipse sibi scripsit by Marcus Aurelius, 
one can fi nd a signifi cant explanation of justice: 
Sen. ep. 81,7: “hoc certe” inquis “iustitiae convenit, suum cuique reddere, benefi cio gratiam, ini-
uriae talionem aut certe malam gratiam” verum erit istud cum alius iniuriam fecerit, alius ben-
efi cium dederit; nam si idem est, benefi cio vis iniuriae extinguitur. nam cui, etiam si merita non 
antecessissent, oportebat ignosci, post benefi cia laedenti plus quam venia debetur. 
Mar. Aur., med. 4,10: Quidquid accidit, juste accidit, idque, si diligenter animadverteris, reper-
ies: non tandum dico secundum id quod consequens est, sed secundum justitiae rationem (kat¦ 
15 Cf. F. Senn, De la justice..., p. 19 f. and nt. 3; U. von Lübtow, Die Anschauungen..., p. 529 f.; M. Dies-
selhorst, Die Gerechtigkeitsdefi nition, p. 186 f.; A. Schiavone, Giuristi e principe..., p. 13 f. 22; W. Wald-
stein, Zur Ulpians Defi nition..., p. 214 f.; idem, Zur juristische Relevanz..., p. 17 f.; L. Winkel, Die stoische
o„ke…wsij-Lehre und Ulpians Defi nition der Gerechtigkeit, “Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsge-
schichte. Romanische Abteilung” (hereafter ZRG RA)1988, Bd. 105, p. 672 f.; U. Manthe, Beiträge zur 
Entwicklung des antiken Gerechtigkeitsbegriffes I, ZRG RA 1996, Bd. 113, p. 2 and nt. 2.
16 Cf. B. Biondi, Diritto e giustizia nel pensiero romano, “Jus” 1958, vol. 9, p. 296 f.; cf. also L. Ciferri, 
Conoscenza e concezione del diritto in Cicerone, “Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité” 1994, vol. 
41, p. 156 f., who directly relates Ulpianus’ defi nition of justice with the expression suum cuique tribuere; 
comp U. von Lübtow, Die Anschauungen..., p. 525 f.
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tÕ d…kaion – add. P.Ś), quasi ab aliquo, qui secundum dignitatem distribuat (ka… æj ¨n ØpÒ tinoj 
¢ponšmontoj tÕ kat’ ¢x…an- add. P.Ś). Animadverte igitur diligenter, ut coeperas, et quidquid agis, 
cum studio bonitatis age, idque eo sensu, quo quis proprie bonus dicitur. Id in omni actione serva.
As explained by these two fi ne followers of the Stoics, it is fair to give everyone, in 
various forms, what they should have – gratitude for benevolence but revenge or unkind-
ness for harm. This is, therefore, the right – the just – thing to do.17
The formula (like many other moral concepts) was borrowed by the Romans from 
the Greeks.18 Aristotle in Rhetorica and Ethica Nicomachea (EN 1132 b 32 sqq.; also: 
1130 a–b; 1131 a) described “justice” as one of the most important fundaments of virtue 
(¢ret»), claiming that it is a virtue which requires assigning to every man what is owed 
to him in accordance with law; Aristotle further confronted it with “injustice” recognized 
as actions in opposition to law:19
Arist. rhet. 1366 b: ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι᾽ ἣν τὰ αὑτῶν ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος: 
ἀδικία δὲ δι᾽ ἣν τὰ ἀλλότρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ νόμος.
DikaiosÚnh, identifi ed with ethical perfection, is the most important and the greatest 
of virtues; in relation to other men, a realization of the ethical perfection per se, and the 
latter has to rely on the dedication of what men deserves. However, it was already the 
master of the Stagirite, Plato, who in his dialogue Politeia, while mentioning the trial of 
poet Simonides of Ceos (polit. 331 E, 433 E-434 A), concluded that justice (δικαιοσύνη) 
is the ability to give each what is due to him:20
Plat. polit. 331 E: τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστin.
Then, as confi rmed by literary transfers which happened over the centuries of the de-
velopment of European culture, this natural law principle was adopted by the Christians 
from the Greek philosophers and from pagan Rome, and after being baptized so-to-
speak, it eventually became a part and parcel of the Christian emperor Justinian’s le-
gal reforms, the basis of his vision of law and justice, his law’s Rechtsprinzip and its 
Gerechtigkeitsprinzip. It remains a fundamental and essential defi nition of the Western 
concept of justice, and, indeed, it is inarguably universal in its separate “second”, 
17 Cf. M. Villey, Suum jus..., p. 364 f., who explained: “A chacun ce qu’il vaut, son juste prix, la récom-
pense ou le chatiment proportionnés à ces mérites: ¢x…an (in the sense of a reward or punishment that one 
deserves), suivant les modèles grecs. Mais aussi bien (le mot cuique pouvant etre entendu au neutre) la jus-
tice déterminera le statut de chaque chose selon l’équité. Le rôle du juriste sera donc (s’il est vrai que le but 
d’Ulpien est d’en proposer la formule), d’attribuer à chacun et à chaque chose, la condition juridique qui lui 
revient”. This interpretation is adopted in subsequent romanistic literature, cf. e.g.: G. Luraschi, Il “porae-
mium” nell’esperienza giuridica romana, [in:] Studi in onore di Arnaldo Biscardi, vol. 4, Milano 1983, p. 
250  45; comp. S. Tzitzis, Dikaion dianemitikon et ius suum cuique tribuens. de la Retribution des Grecs à 
celle des Glossateurs, “Studi Economico-Giuridici Università di Cagliari”, 1991–1992, vol. 54: Il Problema 
della pena criminale tra fi losofi a greca e diritto Romano (Atti Convegno Cagliari 1989), Napoli 1993, p. 221 
f.; see also U. Manthe, Beiträge zur Entwicklung des Antiken Gerechtigkeitsbegriffes II: Stoische Würdigkeit 
und die Iuris Praecepta Ulpians, ZRG RA, 1997, Bd. 114, pp. 1–12.
18 See, a synthetic analysis of this borrowing in G. Falcone, Ius suum..., p. 140 f.
19 See, in part. W. Waldstein, Zur juristischen Relevanz..., p. 64. 
20 Cf. Calvinus, Lexicon iuridicum Iuris Caesarei, ed. Genevae 1602, p. 1481, who wrote that Ulpianus 
in his defi nition “Simonidem et Platonem imitatus”. After: G. Falcone, Ius suum..., p. 144.
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“third”, or simply “next” life.21 Dutch philosopher Andreas Kinneging summed up these 
phenomena of subsequent lives of the phrase suum cuique by saying: “Through Plato, 
Aristotle, Cicero, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and the Corpus Iuris Iustiniani, this idea 
of justice [suum cuique tribuere] for a long time remained a standard notion in Western 
thinking”.22
3. A Commentary on the Tradition
A commentary23 can be said in chorus – both a single- and multi-epoch one – by authors 
who refer to themselves, by interpreters who try to understand what is commented, and 
by commentators who links with a text. An interpretation and a comment are expres-
sions of emotions, almost like in the Japanese theatre, where a role calls for physical 
and mental transformation, sometimes in order to shock the audience by modern, noisy, 
and outlandish way of a performance.24 The repertoire of roles that commentator has at 
his disposal is undetermined, and it exceeds that of a Viewer, to a Supporter, a Guide, 
a Partner, a Choir, a Creator, or – unfortunately – only a simple Duplicator. However, 
roles always grow into the bodies, and masks grow into the faces of commentators; being 
a commentator means to do it not without a punishment. There is also no monopoly on 
a role or a mask – a commentator articulates or remains silent on what he is exposed to 
or what he is subjected to. A commentary is therefore, not a privilege, and not everyo-
ne has a chance to exhibit his own emotions, which appear in connection with the text 
“lost” somewhere and somehow in the cultural tradition, sometimes even used at the 
level of random verbal games. However, a question must arise about the place of such 
a game and about its coordinates (in the worst case, the original meaning of a commen-
ted text disrupts coordinates) which can transform cultural signs into a swamp of ideas. 
Therefore, to demonstrate a tragedy in whose stomach lurks a farce which can also be 
a virus from the future, one can use major or minor memorials: “The phrase suum cui-
que”, whose timeliness is tomorrow, had over the centuries retained and still has reteined 
precisely such a “monumental importance” of some phenomena.
21 To use the concept invented by Paul Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Mediaeval Europe (fi rst publ. Lon-
don–New York 1909, cit. after the repr. version: New Jersey 2001), p. 4, who spoke about “the second life 
of Roman law”.
22 The Geography of Good and Evil – Philosophical Investigations, transl. I. Hardy, Wilmington 2009, 
p. 150; see also P. Stein, J. Shand, Legal Values in Western Society, Edinburgh 1974, p. 60 f.; R.W.M. Dias, 
Jurisprudence, 3 ed., London 1970, pp. 163 f., 183.
23 See Słownik terminów literackich [A Dictionary of Literary Terms], ed. J. Sławiński, 2 ed. Wrocław–
–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1989, s.v. komentarz and komentarz literacki [commentary and literary 
commentary], pp. 229–230.
24 See: T. Izutsu, Metafi zyczne tło teorii NŌ. Analiza „dziewięciu etapów Zeamiego” [The Metaphysi-
cal Background of the Theory of Noh. An Analysis of Zeami’s ‘Nine Stages’], and D. Keene, Realizm 
i nierzeczywistość w teatrze japońskim [Reality and Unreality in Japanese Drama], both in: Estetyka japońska 
[Japanese Aesthetics], 1. Wymiary przestrzeni [Dimensions of Space], ed. K. Wilkoszewska, Kraków 2001, 
pp. 71 f., 89 f. 
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3.1. Shakespeare and Titus Andronicus
An expert on Shakespeare’s works, Jan Kott, wrote that if the cruel tragedy Titus 
Andronicus was one act longer, the author would have touched the spectators seated in 
the fi rst row and he would have drown them in the sea of blood as he did the protanists.25
Titus Andronicus by Shakespeare26 is an early play (believed to have been written be-
tween 1588 and 1593), often regarded as not a “happy” work.27 It seems that the problem 
for interpreters had to be (as it still has to be) caused by the amount of horror, almost 
a grotesque excess of sufferings and deaths, barbarisms compared to which the tragedy 
of Seneca seems a pastiche, even though one cannot say whether deliberately.28 It is 
signifi cant, however, that such an excess of blood and violence, such decadence, such 
descent into low life, are often needed in theatre, such a type of description of reality was 
extremely popular at that time of the Elizabethan theatre in the 16th century.29 Therefore, 
in Titus Andronicus, perhaps one of his most maligned plays, the other – the third world 
has uncompromisingly and violently entered the territory of the fi rst one – the old one, 
and the latter has boldly responded to it. 
In Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus the Romans and the Goths are similarly sav-
age or vicious, yet Romans are set apart because they are more like the early modern 
Europeans.30 Therefore, the Goths are the third world, the Goths defeated by the Romans 
under the command of Titus Andronicus. But it was the defeated Queen Tamora who be-
25 J. Kott, Szekspir, dramaturg elżbietański [Shakespeare, an Elizabethan dramatist], Warszawa 1965, 
p. 27 f. See also other comments by this author (ibidem): “Titus Andronicus is by no means the most brutal 
of Shakespeare’s plays. More people die in Richard III. King Lear is a much more cruel play. In the whole 
Shakespearean repertoire, I can fi nd no scene as revolting as Cordelia’s death. Upon reading, the cruelties 
of Titus may seem ridiculous. But I have seen it on the stage and found it a moving experience. Why? While 
watching Titus Andronicus, we come to understand – perhaps more than by looking at any other of Shake-
speare’s plays – the nature of his genius: he gave an inner awareness to passions; cruelty ceased to be merely 
physical. Shakespeare discovered the moral hell. He discovered heaven as well. But he remained on earth” 
[Transl. P. Święcicka].
26 See W. Shakespeare, Titus Andronicus (Oxford Shakespeare), ed. E.M. Waith, Oxford 1984, 2 ed. 
1994. All references to the play cite this edition.
27 See, e.g. a commentary of a Polish translator of this play, Maciej Słomczyński, Posłowie [Afterword] 
[in:] Najżałośniejsza Rzymska Tragedia Titusa Andronicusa: Shakespeare. Dzieła w przekładzie Macieja 
Słomczyńskiego, Kraków 1986, p. 139 f., who speaks about the accumulation of grotesque cruelty. An account 
of harsh criticism the play received, from Samuel Johnson to T.S. Eliot, can be found in the introduction to 
Jonathan Bate’s edition of Titus Andronicus: J. Bate, Introduction [in:] W. Shakespeare, Titus Andronicus. ed. 
by Jonathan Bate (The Arden Shakespeare), London 2003, pp. 1–121, in part. pp. 33–37. Daniel Kane recog-
nises an anticipation of Artaud’s theatre of cruelty in Titus Andronicus. Cf. D. Kane, The Vertue of Spectacle 
in Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus, pp. 1–17. 
28 Shakespeare may have consulted the Gesta Romanorum, a well-known thirteenth-century collection of 
tales, legends, myths, and anecdotes in Latin, which took fi gures and events from history and spun fi ctional 
tales around them. In particular, excerpts from Seneca (e.g. Thystes) and Ovid (e.g. Methamorphoses) were 
known to such authors of the Elizabethan period as Thomas Kyde or Christopher Marlowe, from the com-
monly used school grammar book by William Lyly. Cf. R. Dyboski, William Shakespeare, Kraków 1927, p. 
10 f.
29 M. Słomczyński, Posłowie [Afterword], p. 139 f. 
30 For an analysis of the rhetorical construction of barbarism in the period, see I. Smith, Barbarian Er-
rors: Performing Race in Early Modern England, “Shakespeare Quarterly” 1998, vol. 49, pp. 168–186; see 
also R. Broude, Roman and Goth in Titus Andronicus, “Shakespeare Studies” 1970, vol. 6, pp. 27–34.
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came a willing wife of emperor Saturninus and a real ruler of Rome. Her sons have raped 
and mutilated a daughter of Titus – Lavinia, and secret lover of Tamora – Aaron the Moor 
had tried to blow up the center of Rome. Finally Lucius, a son of Titus, was looking for 
help for Rome from the Goths and to receive it he had to become one of them. Lucius 
and the Goths obtained the power over Rome.
An invocation to Roman justice appears at the very beginning of the play, and it sta-
bilised Titus’s confl ict with Natural law which lasts throughout the play. In the fi rst scene 
of the play, Tamora’s son Alarbus is ritually sacrifi ced. Pleading for him, Tamora accuses 
Titus of “cruel, irreligious piety” (1,1,133). She denounces his decision as barbaric and 
unethical from a perspective of Natural law. Afterwards, in order to celebrate the appoint-
ment of the new emperor, Titus unreservedly gives his daughter Lavinia to Saturninus 
(1,1,244–52) but unbeknownst to Titus, Bassianus had already been betrothed to her. 
A fray ensues in which Titus’s sons carry Lavinia away from him. Marcus protests: 
“Suum cuique”is our Roman justice.
The prince [Bassianus – add. P.Ś.] in justice seizeth but his own. (1,1,280–81) 
The stakes of the dispute increase until Titus kills his son to protect Lavinia.31 When 
one of the other sons reprimands him, Titus responds: 
Nor thou, nor he, are any sons of mine.
My sons would never so dishonour me. (1,1,294–95)
The Latin phrase meaning “to each his own” – the basic principle of Natural law – 
and the twice used term “justice” as well as the legal term “seize” for taking possession 
of property set the legal tone of this dispute. It ends with Titus killing his son Mucius 
because he does not obey his father’s decision. This instance shows that Titus values 
observance of the Roman rule more than his children’s lives. It suggests furthermore 
that the stability of the Roman tradition and the precedent are deeply connected with the 
stability of Titus’ identity as a Roman.
The Romans, as dominating others at the opening of the play, are forced to become 
more like the real dominant culture. In their quest for justice, Romans exchange their 
honor for a more sophisticated, politicised (and in some respects more early modern) 
dimension of honor – masculinity.32 This transition, making the Romans more akin to 
the Goths, also facilitates the union of the Romans and the Goths at the end of the play.
The invocation of the Latin phrase suum cuique in Shakespeare’s drama is united 
with the assumption that Rome represents goodness, civilisation and order,33 and the 
31 J.C. Bulman notes: “Titus lets a point of honor supersede even a bond of blood: he kills his son Mutius 
in order to confi rm his loyalty to the emperor.”: The Heroic Idiom of Shakespearean Tragedy, Toronto–Lon-
don 1985, p. 45.
32 E. Giddens, Masculinity and Barbarism in Titus Andronicus, “Early Modern Literary Studies” 
2010–2011, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 1–35.
33 J.M. Robertson, Alleged Shakespearean Legal Allusions [in:] Who Wrote “Titus Andronicus”?, Lon-
don 1905, pp. 53–57. For the legal discourse in Titus Andronicus, see also D. Callaghan, C.R. Kyle, The Wilde 
Side of Justice in Early Modern England and Titus Andronicus [in:] The Law in Shakespeare, eds. C. Jordan, 
K. Cunningham, London 2007, pp. 38–57; G.W. Keeton, Shakespeare’s Legal and Political Background, 
London 1967, passim. 
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Goths represent evil, barbarism and chaos.34 However, such attempts at creating an arti-
fi cial binary division into good and evil have been steadily eroding, so it is now axiom-
atic to note the similarities between Romans, Goths, and Moors, especially in how their 
respective quests for revenge are equally brutal. 
Everyone professes to be in favor of justice, and yet, no matter how sincerely just 
solutions to problems are sought, they are often elusive and uncertain, owing to diffi cul-
ties inherent in the very idea of justice.
3.2. Heiner Müller and Anatomy Titus
Heiner Müller (1929–1995) was a German (formerly East German) dramatist, poet, wri-
ter, essayist, and theatre director. He is quite often described as “the theatre’s greatest 
living poet” since Samuel Beckett. Müller is arguably the most important German dra-
matist of the 20th century after Berthold Brecht. His “enigmatic, fragmentary pieces” are 
a signifi cant contribution to postmodern drama and post-dramatic theatre.35 
The play Anatomie Titus: Fall of Rome. Ein Shakespearekommentar (= Anatomy 
Titus: Fall of Rome. A Shakespearean Commentary)36 is a drama written in 1984 or 
1985. It was considered a prophecy announcing the fall of the Soviet Empire – the “evil 
empire”. It is also judged, to a large extent, as “a translation” – a sort of a commentary 
to the play by Shakespeare. Müller, however, was known for his “Shakespearean varia-
tions” – comments to the works of Shakespeare (as well as other playwrights or Brecht), 
which were not classical adaptations, but attempts to fi nd in the classical texts a new en-
ergy, with wealth of associations, being expressions of the inner contradictions of the de-
scribed events, phenomena and emotions. It is a truly brilliant literary material. Although 
it defi nitely proves that author’s main objective was to show, in a theatrical way, the 
specifi c experience of the divided Germany and Europe, which served as the general 
development idea of the issues of Germania – the national identity of the Germans, their 
typical characteristics and different historical manifestations.
In Anatomy Titus – this particular analysis of the past – the precision with which the 
author removes the ground from under the feet of a fi xed order in which “Rome is Rome 
and the Emperor is the Emperor” is absolutely striking.
The gap which appears before every dramatis persona is created only to legitimise 
the way of successive killing. But when old Titus – by making a sacrifi ce of the fi rstborn 
son of Tamora, the defeated Queen of the Goths, says, “I am sorry Madame, he dies, 
it is a custom. In order to captivate the shadows of our dead” – such a decision is still 
compatible with logic. The logic of this death can be – even in opposition to the action 
– understood, because it comes from an ancient custom, even if an inhumane one. But 
when Titus announces: “I want to change the sky into a bloody bladder!”– one knows 
that whatever happens afterwards will be devoid of such logic. And it is not just because 
34 R. Broude, Roman and Goth in Titus Andronicus, “Shakespeare Studies” 1970, vol. 6, pp. 27–34.
35 E. Wright, Postmodern Brecht: A Re-Presentation, London–New York 1989; J. Kalb, The Theater of 
Heiner Müller, 2 rev. ed., Cambridge 2001.
36 H. Müller, Anatomie Titus: Fall of Rome – Ein Shakespearekommentar, Münster 1985. The translation 
of the quotations by P. Święcicka.
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of the (clinical?) madness of the Roman leader, even if Titus astutely confesses “I think 
I got crazy”. But because of the violation of the moral border behind which any action 
can be nothing else than an action in madness. Such an action becomes a consistent 
method of a fi ght against “people-wastes”.37
“The Fall of Rome”? To which Empire does Müller refer? Sometimes a spectator 
can have an impression that it is Europe as a continent and as an idea, the constitution of 
which tries to keep in check a furious animal lost in the night of doubts – over-aestheti-
cised appearances of order and government, fetishised prosperity and happiness, and the 
relationship between the human colonisers and colonised, subsequent wars, economic cri-
ses, new walls, multiple manifestos, proving the inferior status of subsequent civilisation.
Europe, which makes emoticons of people and their rights understood as the museum 
objects. The Crystal Palace – as described by Dostoyevsky in 1862; or the European 
Glasshouse? One can therefore ask: is it only an architectural metaphor of today’s world? 
Or is it just today’s world? After all, not only today is the world a kind of hothouse, 
which under the pretense of heyday hides signs of decay: a relationship of power and 
subordination, the suffering and frustration of some and a sublime contempt of others, 
a brutalised and commercialized defi nition of vectors of human compounds, a mixture 
of nationalities, cultures, races, that generates the refl exes of suspicion and hatred, some-
times hardly suppressed.
Of course, in a description one can go further and try to defi ne a demarcation line of the 
modern world, which delaminates the winners and the defeated – “people-wastes”, those 
in whom there is a power, but who also are to be afraid, and with whom no one wants to 
have anything to do – unless in the language of violence and trade etc. It is Barbaria, and 
not the world; Barbaria squawks with an incomprehensible language – as long as it is 
a language at all. But for what reason one should go on with such a description?
In Müller’s commentary, as well as a few centuries earlier, in Shakespeare’s one, the 
Romans “import” the Goth slaves to the capital of the world – Rome. They are proud 
of them – Goths are trophies, which are to demonstrate the superiority of the Roman 
civilisation (as the Romans understand it) over Barbaria. The Goths are for them only 
“men-wastes” who need to be shaped, so they can be incorporated into the bloodstream 
of the “normal” society. The problem is, however, that “people-wastes” are also beings 
who want their own subjectivity, and taking them into account in the collective account 
draws the consequences of the simple fact of their existence in the set of human relation-
ships. But moving towards freedom inevitably leads to the confrontation with the win-
ners. Titus, in the fi rst refl ex of bestiality, which he suffered from the Queen of the Goths 
Tamora (the killing of his sons), howls and calls for “justice” – just as she did while 
calling that “her guts are not able to accommodate the pain”, so she demands “Roman 
justice”. The Only Just People? Monologues about Roman justice, about its searching at 
the bottom of the oceans, and in the midst of waste, provoke the thought of fundamenta 
on which Rome was established, of law and custom, even if an infl ation of human val-
ues, which were considered to be persistent, already was known. In this way a revenge 
appears and matures – a revenge, that is no longer so much a compass of hysterical 
behaviors arisen from the inhumane sufferings, where the violence sanctioned before 
37 Z. Bauman, Życie na przemiał [Wasted Lives. Modernity and its Outcasts], Kraków 2004, pp. 15 f., 35.
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turns into mindless cruelty. It is all about a revenge as a cynical game, where cruelty, 
vindictiveness, unforgiveness turn into a consistent plan of torture and extermination.
The Domino effect – it is only necessary to start a mechanism, which is an overture 
before the fi nal. In this way, the cynical Titus, in the name of the Roman order and 
“Roman Justice” incarnated in words suum cuique, in the name of helping out to carry 
the torch that could save the civilisation from the darkness, in the name of the greatness 
of Rome, implements, by all means, a plan of physical annihilation of Barbaria, for 
which there is no future. In this way, however, the world will lose the fundaments of 
such values as freedom, solidarity, respect for diversity, human rights, and the universal 
justice in the formula suum cuique, on which it was erected and which determines its 
sense. But this is only the sphere of decorum because the real sphere undergoes a com-
plete deconstruction. A great trap of a world, which, in the play, is a Clown representing 
Rome and its society? 
4. Where is “universal justice”?
The recourse to “Roman justice” has the purpose of justifi cation towards an auditorium – 
the recipients of the message of one’s own actions when these cannot be justifi ed through 
its formal validity. It is, therefore the recourse to imponderabilia, the understanding of 
which does not result from a normal course of philosophy, and refers to other qualities. 
This is invoked in the words of the aforementioned two authors, though they are separa-
ted from each other by centuries – eras – the visions of the words, and who incarnated the 
phenomenon of Roman justice in two words – considered the most appropriate for their 
own narrative and evaluative description of reality and the postulated world.
In the 16th century, Shakespeare, though in Roman justice he saw a vain philosophy 
scheme deprived of the links with experience and subjective feelings, referred, with-
out any deeper analysis, to the Roman idea of justice. Müller, one of the most impor-
tant German dramatist of the second half of the 20th century, screaming in the voice of 
Tamora who demands “Roman justice,” shows that a call for almost the last time to the 
Roman fundamenta, as well as to Roman iura et mores, stands in the unsolved confl ict 
with own inhumane actions and infl ation of all values that mankind has persistently con-
sidered as permanent. Is it Universalism?
There is great wisdom in the legal maxim that justice is suum cuique. One can that 
suum cuique is a part of Natural law. However, one must not forget that also the Devil 
knows Latin. Likewise, the Devil speaks the language say Natural Law, though he plies 
it so as to deceive. The supreme aping of Natural Law in recent history is the use of 
suum cuique – Jedem das Seine, by the Nazi regime. In what can only be characterized 
as a gross historical irony some Nazi bureaucrats chose the defi nition for justice – Jedem 
das Seine – as the motto to be emblasoned on the gates of the Buchenwald concentration 
camp. Cicero would state: Servari enim iustitia, nisi a forti homine, nisi a sapiente, non 
potest (de fi n. 5,23,66).
